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THE SUPREME COURT UNDER FIRE
Louis H. Pollak-
I
"NOT SINCE THE Nine Old Men shot down Franklin Roosevelt's Blue Eagle
in 1935 has the Supreme Court been the center of such general commo-
tion... ."1 The reasons are plain. In the closing weeks of the October term,
1956, the Court handed down a spate of opinions boldly reasserting its
authority to review and overturn federal and state action-judicial, legis-
lative and executive--of the highest sensitivity: the Court upset Smith
Act convictions; 2 curbed federal3 and state4 legislative investigations of
"un-American" or "subversive" activity; limited state authority to refuse
admission to the bar on the basis of alleged past Communist belief;5 vindi-
cated the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination by one charged
with conspiring to defraud the government of taxes; 6 protected the right of
a fugitive Communist and his abettors to be free from unlawful search and
seizure;7 required that a defendant charged with filing a false non-Commu-
nist affidavit be furnished access to government witnesses' reports to the
FBI;8 cast grave doubt on federal authority to court-martial civilian depend-
ents of American military personnel stationed abroad;9 and gave renewed
evidence that the principles declared in the School Segregation Cases'0
would not be compromised."
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School. The writer wishes to acknowledge, with
gratitude, the assistance of Louise E. Farr, Research Associate, Yale Law School. The writer
also wishes to point out, as bearing on his bias in favor of the decision in the School Segre-
gation Cases, that he worked peripherally on the briefs in those cases as a member of tho
NAACP's National Legal Committee, and has been of counsel for plaintiffs in the Girard
College Case, note 11 infra.
170 Time, No. 1, at 11 (July 1, 1957).
2 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
3 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
4 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
5 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353
U.S. 232 (1957).
6 Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
7 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); cf. Steinberg v. United States, 76 S.Ct.
822 (1956).
8 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
9 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957), uphold-
ing the government's authority to surrender an American soldier stationed abroad to the au-
thorities of the host nation to face criminal prosecution.
10 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); and Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
11 See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors (Girard College Case), 353 U.S. 230 (1957);
Cf. Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard,
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Pub. L. 428 1957
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT SYMPOSIUM
Strong courts provoke controversy, and the emergence, under Chief
Justice Warren, of a "new" Court ready to exercise full judicial power has
proved no exception to the rule. But more than mere controversy and
"commotion" have been aroused. Today, regrettably, the Supreme Court
is the object of a "wave of sometimes hysterical attack.' u2 The attack comes
from many quarters, but is garbed in a rhetoric of tedious redundancy:
(1) Senator Byrd, for example, has found it appropriate to assail "the
modern Thaddeus Stevens, now cloaked in the robes of the Chief Justice
of the United States Supreme Court,' 3 who "has done and is doing more
to destroy the form of government we have in this country than has any
Chief Justice in the history of the United States"; 14 whether the civil rights
legislation over which the Senate battled this past summer reflected "any
conspiracy between Chief Justice Warren and the NAACP," Senator Byrd
"could not say."' 5
(2) Senator Jenner has proposed to restrict the Court's appellate juris-
diction over cases relating to "subversion" or contempt of legislative bodies
because the Court "is undermining efforts of the people's representatives
at both the state and national levels to meet and master the Communist
plot."'16
(3) Federal District Judge Timmerman has recently taken the justices
to task for "reading meanings into the Constitution and out of it that dis-
criminate against white citizens, especially those of the so-called Deep
South," and for "construing the Constitution so as to make it a protective
shield for the criminally disposed and disloyal elements in our population."' 7
(Of course, to be fair to the jurist, Judge Timmerman was speaking "as a
private citizen."'18 )
(4) New Hampshire's Attorney General Louis C. Wyman, speaking as
head of the National Association of Attorneys General, has charged that
some of the Court's recent decisions constituted an attempt "'by flat of
five appointed justices' to substitute what he called a philosophy of govern-
ment patently contrary to that contemplated by the Constitution's makers."' 9
66 Yale L.J. 979 (1957). And consult Miller, Racial Discrimination and Private Education
(1957), for a discerning discussion of the possible radiations of the School Segregation Cases
beyond strictly "public" schools. The impact of the decision on Catholic parochial schools,
for example, is of enormous significance: "Nor does the Vatican attach any importance to
argument that segregation does not necessarily constitute discrimination. The Vatican thinks
it does, and believes in any case that the matter was settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States." N. Y. Times, p. 16, col. 4 (Aug. 10, 1957).
12 Speech of President David F. Maxwell to the American Bar Association, N. Y. Times,
p. 14, col. 3 (July 16, 1957).
13 103 Cong. Rec. 10,672 (July 16, 1957).
14 Ibid., at 10,675.
l5 Ibid.
16 N. Y. Times, p. 35, coL 4 (July 27, 1957).
17N. Y. Times, p. 6, col. 7 (July 26, 1957).
18 Ibid.
19 Mr. Wyman was addressing the annual meeting of the National Association of Attor-
neys General. N. Y. Times, p. 1, col. 7, p. 18, col 3 (June 25, 1957). Wyman's further re-
marks disclose his particular concern with the Sweezy case (354 U.S. 234 [1957]) which he
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(5) The General Assembly of Georgia, by formal resolution of February
22, 1957, called for the impeachment and removal of the Chief Justice and
Justices Black, Reed,20 Frankfurter, Douglas and Clark, because they "are
guilty of attempting to subvert the Constitution of the United States, and of
high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and of giving aid or comfort to
the enemies of the United States after taking an oath to support the
Constitution .... ,,21
Calumny of so gross a nature impels response. Thus it was hardly sur-
prising to find the American Bar Association, at its recent sittings in New
York, confronted with a resolution calling on lawyers to refrain from abus-
ing the Court, lest "our judicial system is... destroyed by contemptuous
disregard of the court's decisions with which we do not agree."22 The
resolution created a serious quandary for the assembled men of law:
rejection of the resolution might sound like a slap at the Court; but adoption
would not only have regrettable overtones of endorsement of the Court, it
would run counter to deeply felt notions that in a democracy lawyers-like
people-have a right to deplore the teachings of even the highest tribunal.
A cunning stratagem devised by the ABA's resolutions committee resolved
the dilemma: boldly, their togas wrapped nattily about them, the assembled
delegates voted to take no action on the proposal. And the stratagem
worked; for the good, grey New York Times understood what had transpired
and duly submitted the facts to a candid world.23
had just lost, the Court having set aside a contempt conviction against Professor Paul Sweezy,
who had refused to answer certain questions propounded by Wyman, investigating "subver-
sion" on behalf of the New Hampshire Legislature. "Without being disrespectful," said Wy-
man to his fellow attorneys general, "I believe it is a fair comment to characterize the lan-
guage of the majority in the Sweezy decision as pure sophistry." N. Y. Times, p. 18, col. 3
(June 25, 1957).
Without being disrespectful, it would seem fair comment to round out Wyman's views of
the Supreme Court with a passage from a brief filed by him in the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire on December 21, 1956, in Wyman v. De Gregory, 100 N.H. 163, 132 A.2d 133
(1957), a contempt proceeding against one who refused to answer Wyman's questions despite
a grant of immunity. Urging the appellate court to sustain the trial court's denial of gall
pending appeal, Wyman observed: "The decision of the Superior Court that De Greqory
should stand committed until he replies is not only a sound decision but sorely needed judicial
firmness in a field in which mistaken notions of so-called sympathy for the underdog have
affected higher judicial authority than exists in this state, to the undoubted prejudice of na-
tional. security." Reply to Motion for Reconsideration, Wyman v. De Gregory, supra.
20 Justice Reed is of course no longer on the Court. And assuredly his retirement, an-
nounced some time before, but effective a few days after, the Georgia Resolution, cannot be
ascribed to that document's in terrorem effect. Indeed, in theory, Justice Reed is presumably
still amenable to impeachment; as a retired justice he draws pay, 65 Stat. 724 (1951), 28
U.S.C. § 371 (1952), and may, with his assent, be recalled to "judicial duties in any circuit."
62 Stat. 901 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 294(a) (1952). In fact Justice Reed on July 8, 1957, was
assigned by the Chief Justice "to perform judicial duties in the United States Court of Claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294," 26 U.S.L. Week 3008 (July 9, 1957). It seems questionable
whether the cited statute authorizes assignment to the Court of Claims, which, whether or not
an Article III court (compare 62 Stat. 898 [1948], 28 U.S.C. § 171 [1952] with Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553 [1933]), doesn't appear to perform "judicial duties in any circuit"
except in a geographic sense. (For a time the validity of the assignment appeared mooted by
Justice Reed's appointment as Chairman of the new Civil Rights Commission, N. Y. Times,
p. 1, col. 1 [Nov. 8, 1957], but Justice Reed shortly resigned from the Commission. N. Y.
Times, p. 1, col. 4 [Dec. 4, 1957]. Meanwhile Justice Minton was called upon to serve on the
Court of Claims during December, 1957. 78 S.Ct. xiii [1957].)
21 A Resolution Requesting Impeachment of Six Members of the United States Supreme
Court, Ga. L. (1957) 553, 556.
22 N. Y. Times, p. 17, col. 3 (July 17, 1957).
23 Ibid., at p. 1, col. 8.
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By whatever circuitous route, the ABA of course reached the right result.
Scurrilous attacks on the Court are as old as the nation.24 And, as Mr.
Justice Brewer observed more than a half a century ago, "It is a mistake to
suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or helped by being spoken
of as beyond criticism. On the contrary, the life and character of its justices
should be the objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments
subject to the freest criticism.... True, many criticisms may be, like their
authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no criti-
cism at all."' 5
It is evident that the current attacks on the Court focus primarily on two
areas of adjudication: (1) cases in which the Court has intervened to
strike down penalties or disabilities imposed on persons of alleged or
conceded left-wing persuasion; and (2) cases vindicating Negro rights.
The cases in the first category embrace an enormous range of legal
problems: the permissible scope and the required precision of federal and
state legislative inquiry into political belief, discussion and affiliation;.
the meaning and validity of the Smith Act and kindred federal legislation;27
the extent to which either specific federal statutes2 or the special responsi-
bilities of the federal government for national survival2 foreclose state
restraints on "subversive" activity; the degree to which federal and state
agencies may deny public employment or quasi-public professional status
24 Compare, for example, the views of the General Advertiser, a Philadelphia newspaper,
on the Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316 (1819): "Never was
a bad cause worse supported by constellated talents, learning, and wisdom of a Bench of Su-
preme Judges. It seems as if nature had revolted from the debasing task assigned them; and
that their reason and their judgment had forsaken them, upon an instinctive horror and disgust
for the destructive purposes they were pledged to fulfill, in defiance of all human rights, human
joys and divine commandments." 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History
524-25 (1922).
25 From his address entitled Government by Injunction, delivered on Lincoln Day, 1898,
reprinted in 15 Nat. Corp. Rep. 849 (1898), and quoted in Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes
and the Supreme Court 94 n. 20 (1938).
26 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), and Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Barsky v. United States,
167 F.2d 241 (App. D.C., 1948); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (CA. 2d, 1947).
27 Compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), with Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951); cf. Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
28 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), illustrates the pre-emptive effect of the
Smith Act, which was found to cover the ground of and hence displace Pennsylvania's anti-
sedition legislation. For a far less discriminating application of pre-emption doctrines, com-
pare the decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957) (and the com-
panion cases of Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 [1957], and
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 [1957]), finding in the National
Labor Relations Act an intent to oust state boards and courts from regulating small-scale
interstate labor relations problems which the NLRB has consistently chosen to stay out of
rather than dilute the efforts it must expend on major matters.
29 See U. S. Const. Preamble; U. S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and
§10, cI. 3; U. S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cls. 1 2- U. S. Const. Art. III, § 3; U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 4;
U. S. Const. Amends. 2, 3, 5, and 14, H§3, 4;but cf. U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 2, ci. 2. See
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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on suspicion of unpopular beliefs or associations; 30 and the minimal pro-
cedural demands of criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. 31
From "academic freedom" and "federal-state relations" to "search-and-
seizure" and "vagueness," these cases march across the pages of the digests
under a hundred legal banners. But a pragmatic annotator like Judge Tim-
merman collects all these cases under the single headnote: "a protective
shield for the criminally disposed and disloyal elements in our population, '32
and thereby manages with a gaudy phrase to miseducate his countrymen.
And people are ripe for this sort of miseducation, for it is much easier to
revere concepts like free speech and due process of law when they glow
abstractly in the nation's rhetoric than when they insulate a particular Red
or rapist against retribution. The difficulty is, of course, that the law-abiding
and God-fearing have no real reason to believe the anachronism on which
our entire jurisprudence rests: "Although the defendant may be the worst
of men ... the rights of the best of men are secure only as the rights of
the vilest and most abhorrent are protected." 3 And the judge who inter-
venes on behalf of the vile and abhorrent can, therefore, expect to reap his
crop of calumny.
Therefore, criticisms of the Court for decisions favoring political pariahs
ordinarily come as no surprise and furnish little ground for serious con-
cern. 34 The vindication of constitutional liberties presupposes that courts
will oppose majorities bent on committing acts of oppression.35 It is not to
be expected that more than a minority of the community will ever genuinely
understand the democratic imperative of protecting "the expression of
30 Compare Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); compare Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957), with In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945), and Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S.
442 (1954).
31 E.g., Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); and Emspak v. United States,
349 U.S. 190 (1955); compare Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123 (1951), with Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S.
331 (1955); and see cases cited notes 26 and 30 supra. See also Shaughnessy v. Mezel, 345
U.S. 206 (1953); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524 (1952); and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
32 See text at note 17 supra.
33 People v. Gitlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 158, 136 N.E. 317, 327 (1922) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Cuthbert Pound). For an excellent contemporary attempt to persuade the nonlegal
community of the primacy of procedural safeguards see Satter, Murder and the Due Process
of Law, The Hartford Courant Magazine (April 14, 1957).
34 E.g., the exchange between Senators Thurmond and Byrd regarding the Jencks, Yates
and Watkins cases (cited at notes 8, 2 and 3 supra). 103 Cong. Rec. 10,676 (July 16, 1957).
MR. THURMOND. Is it not true that the Court handed down a decision in the Jeneks
case which would open up the FBI files and enable the Communists to obtain confidential
information which would be very detrimental to the defense of this country?
MR. BYRD. Yes.
MR. THURMOND. Is it not true that in the Yates case the Court turned loose 5 Com-
munists and granted a new trial to 9 others? They were people who admitted and confessed
to being Communists, and yet the Supreme Court acted in such a manner.
Is it not further true that in the Watkins case the Court has practically destroyed the in-
vestigative power of Congress, which has been so influential and so important in uncovering
crimes and in uncovering Communists and sending them to the penitentiary?
MR. BYRD. The Senator is correct.
35 "Those who won our independence .... [r]ecognizing the occasional tyrannies of gov-
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opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death," 36 or of insist-
ing that "the nation steadfastly... follow its great constitutional traditions,
none older or more universally protective against unbridled power than due
process of law in the trial and punishment of men, that is, of all men .... ,,37
The courage the Court is today demonstrating in defending the rights of
political minorities has been manifest for more than three years in defense
of racial minorities. It was in May of 1954, a few months after the accession
of the new Chief Justice, that the Court, in the School Segregation Cases,
erased the fateful interlineation "separate but equal" from the Constitu-
tion.38 And a review of the brief but turbulent history of the Warren Court3 9
makes it plain that "the current wave of abuse was . . . precipitated by
the school segregation decisions, though it has by no means been limited
to them."
'40
Fundamental misunderstanding and distrust of the Court's role in the
School Segregation Cases raise problems of quite different dimension
from the shock and anger commonly engendered by the various political
cases. The Court's functions in protecting political and racial minorities of
course complement each other. But the basic support of the American
people, which the Court cannot look for when it upholds the rights of
Communists, it must have in full measure if the promise of the School
Segregation Cases is to be fulfilled.
This is so because, as Professor Clark has put it, the Court in the School
Segregation Cases was "speaking the conscience of a majority of the
nation." 41 The Court made more than a judicial finding-it made on behalf
of the American people a confession of error and an admission of guilt-
when it declared that separating Negroes "from others ... solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
erning majorities, amended the Constitution... ." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76
(1927) (concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis).
36 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Holmes).
37 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1946) (dissenting opinion of Justice Rutledge).
There must of course be some minimal minority support for even this aspect of the judicial
function. The brave futility of a judge seeking singlehanded to override lawless executive
authority was made pathetically plain by Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed.
Cas. 144, No. 9,487 (C.C. Md., 1861), which has been described as the "lowest point in the
history of the federal judiciary." Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 324 (1941).
38 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), of course only dealt in terms with
education, it has since been followed in the fields of recreation: Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); and transportation: Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). The Court has thus far felt no enthusiasm for determining
the validity of anti-miscegenation laws. Cf. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
39 Time feels that what it luminously calls "the new look for the law" originated shortly
after Warren became Chief Justice. 70 Time, No. 1 at 12 (July 1, 1957).
40 Recent Attacks Upon the Supreme Court of the United States. A Statement by Members
of the Bar, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1024, 1025 (1956). The Attorney General has noted that "the
Court... has been the subject of a torrent of criticism because of its decisions in the Segre-
gation Cases." Brownell, The United States Supreme Court: Symbol of Orderly, Stable and
Just Government, 43 A.B.A.J. 595, 598 (1957).
41 Clark, Charitable Trusts, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen Girard,
66 Yale L. J. 979, 981 (1957).
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to be undone." 42 If this judicial articulation of the American conscience
was, as over ninety Southern Congressmen have alleged, a "clear abuse
of judicial power"4 3-if the national conscience has no constitutional rele-
vance--then the fabric of American democracy is torn shoddy which can
no longer warm anybody no matter what his complexion.
If, however, the Court was the authorized spokesman of the popular will,
the School Segregation Cases have more than symbolic validity. They then
can and ultimately will be implemented. In this practical sense, too, the
School Segregation Cases differ from the political cases. Decisions setting
aside convictions or other disabilities in political cases are generally of a
negative character which require little popular support to be enforced. But
the decrees in the School Segregation Cases mean years of affirmative
co-ordinated action by judges, lawyers, administrators, legislators, teachers,
parents, and children. The contempt power cannot get the job done "with
all deliberate speed."44 Plainly enough, the contempt power, unaided, can-
not get the job done at all. Integration of public-schools in the Southern and
border states will come about because the "conscience of a majority of the
nation" insists and the Court has said evasion of this mandate is unlawful.45
mII
By scaling down the know-nothingisms of commentators like Judge
Timmerman to the less stimulating but rather more tractable vocabulary
of ordinary discussion, it is possible to come to grips with attacks on the
School Segregation Cases. Stripped of inessentials, the criticism is dual:
(1) that educational policy is entirely outside the federal domain, and
(2) that the Fourteenth Amendment, as a Court familiar with the Amend-
ment declared in Plessy v. Ferguson,46 was not intended to affect segre-
gated public education, at least so long as the separate facilities afforded
were "equal."
The first contention, that state policy in the field of public education is
beyond federal constitutional restraint of any kind, argues from the reser-
vation enshrined in the Tenth Amendment and from the indubitable fact
"that the word 'education' is not even to be found in the United States
Constitution," to an easy Q.E.D. 47 Far too easy. The argument proves
vastly too much: it makes a total dead letter of the equal protection clause,
which requires adherence by "the laws" of every state to a constitutional
standard of equal treatment 'without any differentiation based upon the
42 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
43 Consult Brownell, op. cit. supra note 40, at 598.
44 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
45 For a comprehensive view of the dimensions of the job of implementing the School
Segregation Cases, see McKay, "With All Deliberate Speed" A Study of School Desegregation,
31 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991 (1956). Cf. the wide implications of the School Segregation Cases
adverted to note 11 supra.
46 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
47 E.g., colloquy between Senators Thurmond and Byrd. 103 Cong. Rec. 10, 676 (July
16, 1957).
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content of "the laws. '48 Moreover the argument wholly undercuts the
loudly-insisted-upon merits of Plessy's "separate but equal' rationale,
whether applied to education, transportation, or any other "reserved" field.
The second contention-that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
intended to curtail segregation in public schools-is of course subsumed
in the first contention that no part of the Constitution has any impact on
local educational practices under any circumstances. But the contention
also has separate force, drawn from the undeniable fact that the Court in
1896, in Plessy, sustained against Fourteenth Amendment attack a Louisi-
ana law assigning Negro and white railway passengers to separate cars,
relying principally on decisions upholding compulsory racial separation in
public schools as a "valid exercise of the legislative power. ' 49 The "assump-
tion that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority," and hence accords the races inherently unequal
treatment, was rejected by the Plessy Court as a "fallacy": the alleged
inequality was said to arise "solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it."50
Not content to use the lawyer's trick of simply distinguishing Plessy,5s
the Court acknowledged the relevant language in Plessy and stamped that
language "rejected.
'52
"In reaching its conclusion the Supreme Court," according to the Georgia
Legislature, "has disregarded its former pronouncements and attempted
to justify such action by the expedient of imputing ignorance of psychology
to men whose knowledge of the law and understanding of the constitution
could not be impugned. . . .".Moreover, "in reaching its conclusion the
court, professing itself to be unable to ascertain the intent of those who
adopted the fourteenth amendment to the constitution, arbitrarily chose
to repudiate the solemn declaration of its meaning rendered under the
sanctity of their oaths of office by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States at a time when all of its members were contemporaries of
MR. THURMOND. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator a question or two.
Is it not true, speaking of the segregation decision, that in the first 10 amendments to the
Constitution, known as the Bill of Rights, which were drafted by a great citizen of the Sen-
ator's State, George Mason, the 10th amendment to the Constitution provides that all powers
not specifically delegated to the Federal Government are reserved to the States?
MR. BYRD. The Senator is correct.
MR. THURMOND. Is it not further true that the word "education" is not even to be
found in the United States Constitution?
MR. BYRD: That is correct.
MR. THURMOND. Is it not further true that sifnce the field of education was not
delegated to the Federal Government, therefore it was reserved to the States and should remain
reserved to the States and to the people thereof?
MR BYRD. The Senator is correct.
48 Cf. Brownell, op. cit. supra note 40, at 599.
49 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
50 Ibid., at 551.
51 "This case involved transportation." DeLacy, The Segregation Cases: A Judicial Prob-
lem Judicially Solved, 43 A.B.A.J. 519 (1957).
52 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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those who proposed, discussed, debated, submitted and adopted the
amendment."5
3
Life, America's most widely read law review, has put the case against
the School Segregation Cases on narrower grounds: "Even lawyers who
applauded the decision felt its reasoning was based not on law but on
sociological considerations."5
Parsed, the indictment against the School Segregation Cases has three
counts: abandonment of "law"; contempt for precedent; and disregard of
the intended meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. "Sociology" Instead of "Law"
Can it be fairly said that the Court, spurred on by testimony as to the
psychological effects of segregation, ventured out of the realm of "law"
and into the greener pastures of "science" to find that segregated Negroes
receive inferior schooling? It is of course true, as already observed, that
the Court did say that segregation of Negro children "generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.155 Building upon this
observation, the Court quoted approvingly a trial court "finding" that
state-imposed segregation deprives Negro children of educational benefits;
noted that, "whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge"
in 1896, when Plessy was decided, "modem authority"--referring to pub-
lished psychological scholarship,5 6 not to the scientific testimony on record
in some but not all of the cases-supported the "finding"; and declared that
Plessy language conflicting with the "finding" was "rejected." 57
Plainly enough, "the decisions did not rest upon the testimony of the
social scientists."5 8 Moreover, the cited "modern authority" was only cor-
roborative of what was really decisive-the justices' human awareness that
segregation is "invidious."5 9 "For at least twenty years," as Professor Cahn
has observed, "hardly any cultivated person has questioned that segregation
53 Ga. L. (1957) 553, 559.
5443 Life, No. 1, at 33 (July 1, 1957).
55 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). See text at note 32 supra.
56 The "modem authority" was collected in the now famous (some say infamous) foot-
note 11. Ibid., at 494. The extent to which a court should notice judicially or otherwise, tech-
nical learning in other disciplines is a matter of great subtlety and considerable moment: much
depends, for example, on whether the proferred authority is designed to support or repudiate
the reasonableness of challenged legislative or executive action. For some trenchant consid-
eration by Professor Freund and by Professor Calm, see Calm, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 150, 153-54, 167-68 (1955).
Intimations by the Georgia Legislature that the material cited by the Court in fdotnoto 11
was largely produced by persons "affiliated with organizations declared by the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States to be subversive," Ga. L. (1957) 553. 559, hardly deserve the dignity
of thoughtful consideration: it may be at least as relevant that the Fourteenth Amendment
was itself the consequence of events initiated by subversive activity of an antecedent Georgia
Legislature and associated co-conspirators.
57 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
58 Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the Stand: A Review and Appraisal of Their Testi-
mony in Litigation, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 953, 969 (1956).
59 The term was used by Justice Minton, discussing the cases after he retired from the
bench. 12 Ebony, No. 2, at 99 (Dec. 1956).
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is cruel to Negro school children. The cruelty is obvious and evident.
Fortunately, it is so very obvious that the Justices of the Supreme Court
could see it and act on it even after reading the labored attempts by
plaintiffs' experts to demonstrate it 'scientifically.' "0
By characterizing the judicial recognition of injury as a "finding," the
Court did render itself vulnerable to doubts which have, regrettably but
understandably, distracted many commentators from the merits of the
decision. Calling something a "finding" gives it factual solidity in the par-
ticular situation which is being litigated, but raises the specter of a contrary
"finding"--and hence a contrary result-on other facts. (Actually, the
School Segregation Cases were five consolidated cases, and the endorsed
Kansas "finding" was echoed at trial in only one of the others; but all five
were decided the same way on appeal. 61) Furthermore, the Court's obser-
vation that the "finding" is "supported" by "modem authority"8 2 can be
read as leaving the door ajar for future repudiation in the light of new scien-
tific learning.63 It might have been better for the Court to have placed racial
equality and the harm engendered by racial segregation among the things
which do not require demonstration-which are less tangible and more
enduring than facts: there is, after all, precedent for the proposition that
"all men are created equal." 64
Too much attention has been devoted to the way in which the Court
reached the conclusion that segregation is injurious. In order to repudiate
60 Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150, 159 (1955). In a few haunting sentences
Professor Calm has made plain the nature of the injury involved in segregation:
"There are people who argue, sometimes quite sincerely, that racial segregation is not
Intended to humiliate or stigmatize. On first impression, the argument seems to have some
slight mitigative value, for surely a deliberate Isult is liable to cut deeper than one inflicted
out of mere crudeness or insensibility. But the mitigation comes too late. An excuse that one
did not intend to injure does not stand much chance of reception when the offender, having
been informed of the damage he has done, continues and persists in the same old callous
insults. As is observed in the ancient Babylonian Talmud, to shame and degrade a fellow-
creature is to commit a kind of psychic mayhem upon him. Like an assailant's knife, humilia-
tion slashes his self-respect and human dignity. He grows pale, the blood rushes from his face
just as though it had been shed. That is why we are accustomed to say he feels 'wounded.'
"Moreover, if affronts are repeated often enough, they may ultimately injure the victim's
backbone. We hear there are American Negroes who protest they do not feel insulted by
racially segregated public schools. If there are any such Negroes, then they are the ones who
have been injured most grievously of all, because segregation has shattered their spines and
deprived them of self-respect." Ibid., at 158-59.
Compare the Vatican's succinct concurrence in the view that segregation is per se wrong,
reported in the passage from the New York Times, quoted note 11 supra.
61 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954).
62 Ibid.
63 Consult Cahn, op. cit. supra note 60, at 167-68. Indeed, arguably, repudiation could
follow if only a reasonable minority of scientific opinion "supported" legislative or executive
action in conflict with the "finding" of the School Segregation Cases. Consult in this regard
note 56 supra.
64 Declaration of Independence. Charles P. Curtis, recalling that Chief Justice Taney, in
the Dred Scott Case (Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. [U.S.] 393, 410, 426 [1857]), denied that the
Declaration embraced Negroes, but that Lincoln disagreed, has observed: "The difference
between them is not only that Taney was wrong and Lincoln right. It is that Taney was
ascribing to the words what he thought their authors intended, and Lincoln was giving the
authors credit for what their words meant." Curtis, The Role of the Constitutional Text, in
Supreme Court and Supreme Law 64, 66 (Calm ed., 1954). Curtis finds little but historical
interest in what was "intended" by the "authors" of declarations and constitutions. Consult
note 91 infra.
HeinOnline  -- 6 J. Pub. L. 437 1957
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
Ples.y, finding injury and according that injury constitutional weight should
not really have been a difficult problem. After all, "the cruelty is obvious
and evident," 65 and judges may not close their minds to what "all others
can see and understand... ."66 The real obstacle presented by Plessy was
the bland assertion that the "badge of inferiority" segregation imposes on
Negroes is not the consequence of state action-that it is unconnected with
the state's exercise of compulsion, but arises "solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it."67 But that piece of legal disin-
genuousness had, prior to the School Segregation Cases, been quietly interred
by the Court in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, which, albeit on
a graduate level, not only sensed the harm in separation but acknowledged
that the state's role aggravated the harm:
These restrictions .... signify that the State... sets McLaurin
apart from the other students.
It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position
when these restrictions are removed, for he may still be set apart
by his fellow students. This we think irrelevant. There is a vast
difference-a Constitutional difference-between restrictions im-
posed by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling
of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the
state presents no such bar. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13-14
(1948). The removal of the state restrictions will not necessarily
abate individual and group predilections, prejudices and choices.
But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appellant of
the opportunity to secur6 acceptance by his fellow students on his
own merits.68
In short, the opinion in the School Segregation Cases might haver been
helped by a crisper statement that (1) "Our Constitution is color-blind,"
69
and scientific validation of its mandates is welcome but legally superfluous;
and (2) Plessy's disavowal of injury and of state responsibility for such
injury are both "rejected."
B. A Decent Respect for Precedent
The conventional arguments for continuity of decision are worthy ones-
but they have strikingly little force in relation to the School Segregation
Cases. The only interest created or expanded "in reliance" upon Plessy and
its progeny was the South's grotesque investment in a dual school system.
Balanced against this budgetary folly was the daily sacrifice of each Negro
65 Cahn, op. cit. supra note 60, at 159 (emphasis added).
66 Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
67 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), quoted in the text, at note 50 supra.
68 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950).
69Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan),
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pupil's "personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws. '70
Beyond this, because the issues were constitutional ones-and fateful
ones at that, bearing on the nation's self-respect and its capacity for world
leadership 7'- ordinary canons of stare decisis were doubly unpersuasive.72
Judges have acknowledged "the greater fluidity of decision which the process
of constitutional adjudication concededly affords"73 ever since Chief Justice
Taney declared his willingness "that it be regarded hereafter as the law of
this court, that its opinion upon the construction of the constitution is
always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in
error, and that its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on
the force of the reasoning by which it is supported."7 4
C. The Meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
Through the industry and generosity of the litigants, texts and testimony
on the effects of segregated schooling poured in on the Court as it pondered
the School Segregation Cases. But it was the Court on its own motion which,
by propounding the famous questions as to the genesis of the Fourteenth
Amendment,75 solicited further information in Brown v. Board of Education
and the companion state cases: What, if anything, had the framers and
ratifiers of the Amendment intended with respect to the immediate or ulti-
mate abolition of segregated public schools?
The months of research by scores of eager partisans produced voluminous
scholarship--"book-size and shelf-length" 76 -but few real answers. The
most objective response-that of the United States-was that there was "no
conclusive evidence of a specific understanding as to the effect of the Four-
teenth Amendment on school segregation .... "'77 And this conclusion the
Court echoed: "[A]Ithough these sources cast some light, it is not enough to
70 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950); see Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
71 Factors underlined by the participation of the United States in support of the plaintiffs.
72 Quite apart from the contention (see note 51 supra) that the Court had never "held"
the Plessy doctrine applicable to education.
73 National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 617 (1949) (concurring
opinion of Justice Rutledge).
74Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U.S.) 283, 470 (1948) (dissenting opinion). Consult Jack-
son, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 294-98 (1941); Frank, Courts on Trial 313 (1949).
It was, of course, Taney's tragedy to be remembered as the author of the one decision-the
Dred Scott case (Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. [U.S.] 393 [1857])-which required not only
amendments but a war to overrule. Cf. note 37 supra.
75 "1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legisla-
tures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not
contemplate, understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public
schools?
"2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment understood that compliance with it would require the immediate abolition of
segregation in public schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the
Amendment.
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power under section 5 of the
Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future conditions, to construe
the Amendment as abolishing such segregation of its own force?" 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
76 Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
6(1955).
77 Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument at 125, Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are incon-
clusive."
78
The government's and the Court's appraisals of the historical materials
have been substantially ratified by later scholarship. Professor Bickel, after
canvassing the materials with care, views the history of the drafting of
Section 1 of the Amendment as "rather clearly demonstrating that it was
not expected . . . to apply to segregation." 79 Professor McKay feels that
"had the requirement of equal protection of the laws been embodied in a
statutory clause rather than a constitutional context, there would seem little
doubt that the judicial construction in the foregoing cases [Plessy and those
"separate but equal" cases which followed it] was a correct interpretation
of the intention of those who framed and adopted it. And there the matter
would rest, at least in the absence of amendment or repeal."8 0
Assuming arguendo the collective accuracy of all this retrospection,81 it
becomes relevant to inquire how the Court reached the conclusion that the
Fourteenth Amendment made segregated public education unconstitutional.
Professor McKay82 finds the answer in the fact that it is not a statute but,
in Chief Justice Marshall's words, " a constitution we are expounding. '83
Professor Bickel, finding "an awareness on the part of these framers that it
was a constitution they were writing," concludes that "the Radical leader-
ship succeeded in obtaining a provision whose future effect was left to future
determination," and hence that "the record of history, properly understood
.. invited" the Court to emancipate itself from the framers' and drafters'
contemporaneous intent.84
Professors McKay and Bickel are doubtless right in large measure, per-
haps in toto, in their not dissimilar constructions of the Court's opinion in
Brown v. Board of Education. The difficulty lies with the opinion, which
does not explicitly adopt either formula but simply recites, in terms the lay-
man, but unfortunately not the lawyer, can understand, that, "in approach-
ing this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amend-
ment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and
its present place in American life .... -85
The lawyer's difficulty in understanding the Court arises from a deeply
ingrained sense of professional constraint which enjoins him to remember,
78 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
79 Bickel, op. cit. supra note 76, at 64.
80 McKay, op. cit. supra note 45, at 996.
81 Before the intensive and extensive research undertaken in response to the Court's
questions, some scholars had viewed the then available materials rather differently, finding if
to have been the net understanding of "the reconstruction decade" (rather than "any particu-
lar year") that the equal protection clause meant "with reservations, for here there is substan-
tial divergence, there should be no segregation in the schools." Frank and Munro, The
Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 Col. L. Rev. 131, 167-68
(1950); cf. ibid., at 162.
82 McKay, op. cit. supra note 45, at 996-97.
83 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316,407 (1819).
84 Bickel, op. cit. supra note 76, at 63-65.
85 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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in the words of Ex parte Bain, "that, in the construction of the language of
the Constitution ... as indeed in all other instances where construction
becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the
condition of the man who framed that instrument." 86 If the framers of a
constitutional provision labored and brought forth a sow's ear, that is
what it is supposed to remain.
A sow's ear may never become a silk purse. But maybe, by shifting the
Bain emphasis a bit, it can become a pigskin wallet. This is, after all, "a
constitution we are expounding." Marshall's great aphorism-potent enough
to validate congressional exercise of a power to incorporate which the
framers discussed but did not embody in the Constitution 7-has surely
been one of the most seminal single influences on subsequent construction
of the Constitution.88 It has permitted the nation to adapt an eighteenth-
century instrument to twentieth-century problems, in recognition that "the
provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form.... Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by consider-
ing their origin and the line of their growth."' 9
In construing constitutional provisions the Court still regards it as its
function to examine both "their origin" and "the line of their growth." Con-
cern for the original intent of the framers of the Constitution remains
high,90 notwithstanding the persuasively fashioned contrary views of com-
86121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
87 5 Elliot's Debates 543-44 (1866). This legislative history was known at the time
McCulloch v. Maryland was decided, for Jefferson had utilized it in his 1791 memorandum to
Washington opposing the Bank Bill. 4 ibid., at 610. Cf. the 1798 extract from Jefferson's
Memoirs, 4 ibid., at 611-12.
88 Justice Frankfurter has described "John Marshall's greatest judicial utterance" as the
"pole-star for constitutional adjudications." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 596 (1952) (concurring opinion). For its impact see, e.g., the fundamental thinking
of Professor Thayer in his essay, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, in Thayer, Legal Essays 1, 13 (1908). Compare Chief Justice Hughes's landmark
opinion in Home Building & Loan Ass'u. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934), and see the
discussion in Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 362-65 (1956), of the role played
by Justices Cardozo and Stone in formulating the opinion.
The impact of Marshall's phrase-or the impact of Justice Story's amiable paraphrase,"We should never forget that it is an instrument of government we are to construe"--has been
little less striking in other English-speaking jurisdictions. See Friedmann, Statute Law and
Its Interpretation in the Modem State, 26 Can. Bar Rev. 1277, 1291-94 (1948).
89 Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
90 For cases prior to the Roosevelt Court, see the extraordinarily comprehensive articles
by tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 287, 437, 664 (1938), 27 Calif. L. Rev. 157, 399
1939). For recent judicial examples see, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
1947); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Ullman v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 (1956); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
91 "One element of the past intrudes quite unnecessarily upon the present. We try to
make the most of the consequences of what our forefathers did, but there is no reason why we
should feel we have to carry out their plans for us. Were they so wise they didn't need to
know the facts? The intention of the framers of the Constitution, even assuming we could
discover what it was, when it is not adequately expressed in the Constitution, that is to say,
what they meant when they did not say it, surely that has no binding force upon us. If we
look behind or beyond what they set down. in the document, prying into what else they wrote
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mentators like Mr. Curtis. 91 Indeed, Adamson v. California,92 in which the
Court split five to four on whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment intended to incorporate in its first section all the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, impressively demonstrates the anxiety of living judges to
learn what the drafters of the post-Civil War amendments intended.
The questions propounded in the School Segregation Cases are, of course,
themselves the best evidence of the Court's strong and persistent interest in
original intention.93 Not itrong enough, doubtless, to permit the Court to
follow Professor Crosskey, even if it were convinced that Crosskey was
right and alt the constitutional history between the Convention and today
founded on misapprehensions. After all, the Court is also concerned with
the Constitution's "line of growth" and ultimately even error may become
sanctified.
94
If, however, the original understanding of the equal protection clause did
permit, as Professor Bickel has urged, "future determination" of its "future
effect,"95 the Court in the School Segregation Cases should have said so
expressly and thereby squared its gearing the clause to present-day realities
with its insistence that the Constitution is a written document of confined
meaning.
The failure to make the decisional process explicit may have been inad-
vertent. Very possibly, however, it was the intended price of a unanimous
decision. For it may be that Justices Black and Douglas, the surviving dis-
senters in Adamson, would have regarded any explicit evolutionary formu-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment as endorsement of the open-ended
view of the Amendment espoused by Justice Frankfurter 96-a view they
and what they said, anything we may find is only advisory. They may sit in at our councils.
There is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs." Curtis, Lions Under the Throne 2
(1947).
92 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Consult Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949).
For other Fourteenth Amendment problems, consult Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory"
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 Yale L. J. 371 (1938), 48 Yale L. J. 171 (1938). Compare
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938) (dissenting opinion),
and Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (dissenting opinion); Wheel-
ing Steel Corp. v. Glander, supra at 574 (separate opinion).
93 Cf. the questions propounded in Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 352 U.S. 901
(1956), which led to overruling of the original decision (351 U.S. 487 [1956]). 354 U.S. 391
1957).
94 Cf. note 92 supra. But cf. the unceremonious overturning of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet.
(U.S.) 1 (1842), in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
95 See text, at note 84 supra.
95 Justice Frankfurter looks upon due process-and also upon other terms like commerce
-as "purposely left to gather meaning from experience," by contrast with such concrete con-
stitutional limitations as the length of the president's term of office, or the meaning of the
word state. National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater, 337 U.S. 582, 676 (1949) (dissenting opin-
ion). The unwillingness of Justices Rutledge and Murphy to find state a concept of unaltera-
ble meaning (National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater, supra, at 623) suggests the appropriate-
ness of Professor Freund's doubt that it is possible to break the Constitution down into con-
cepts which have a fixed meaning and concepts which do not. Consult Cahn, op. cit. supra note
64, at 61. (The judicial conviction that state has a fixed meaning is not too remote from thejudicial assumption that old states and new ones have affixed-namely an equal-relation to
one another. How this assumption was judicially translated into an "equal footing" clause
which the framers deliberately omitted from the Constitution is an adventure in originalunderstanding well told by Mr. Curtis. Curtis, op. cit. supra note 91, at 4-6.)
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equate with a constitutional monstrosity oddly labelled "natural law."O"
Justice Black's quest for certainty in constitutional adjudication-a quest
underscored by his full quotation in the epochal Adamson dissent of the
quaint Bain insistence on placing "ourselves... in the condition of the man
who framed that instrument" 98-is, in short, wholly at odds with the one
apparently documentable interpretation of the intended meaning of the
equal protection clause under which Plessy could not stand.
Moreover, the difficulties a rigorous rationale might have entailed would
only have been multiplied when transferred to the District of Columbia
case, Boiling v. Sharpe.9 9 The Court there equated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection clause and the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause. Support for the equation was found in dictum of 1896' 00-the year
Plessy was decided-and in the observation that any different result would
have been "unthinkable."'1' Unthinkable but not inexplicable' 02-for the
Fifth Amendment goes back to the slaveholding days of 1791-unless Fifth
Amendment "due process" is also an ambulatory concept designed to gather
constitutional moss as it rolls along.' 03 A logical explanation satisfactory to
all members of the Court is not easy to come by.
Apparent inadequacies in the Court's articulation of the decision in the
School Segregation Cases are unfortunate to the extent that they furnish a
stick to beat the Court with. But the inadequacies are not of major dimen-
sion. They do not undercut the merits of the School Segregation Cases-
they merely becloud the precise rationale. If the Court's silences were the
price of unanimity-if a couple of logical steps were dropped in order to
pick up a couple of votes-the cost was insignificant. For the unanimous
decision will shape the nation's future long after caterwauling about the two
opinions has died away.
97 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947).
98 Ibid., at 72; see text, at note 86 supra.
99347 U.S. 497 (1954).
100 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896).
101 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
102 See Cahn, op. cit. supra note 60, at 155.
103 Consult note 96 supra.
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